












CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS: WHY HAVE THEY 
BECOME SO PROMINENT IN RECENT POVERTY 





























CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS: WHY HAVE THEY 
BECOME SO PROMINENT IN RECENT POVERTY 





















Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author: 
c/o ORPAS - Institute of Social Studies - P.O. Box 29776 
2502LT The Hague - The Netherlands 
workingpapers@iss.nl 
                                                 
 































The Institute of Social Studies is Europe’s longest-established centre of higher education 
and research in development studies. Post-graduate teaching programmes range from 
six-week diploma courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the 
sense of laying a scientific basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. 
The academic work of ISS is disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, 
teaching texts, monographs and working papers. The Working Paper series provides a 
forum for work in progress which seeks to elicit comments and generate discussion. The 
series includes the research of staff, PhD participants and visiting fellows, and 
outstanding research papers by graduate students. 
For a list of available Working Papers and how to order them see the last page of this 
Working Paper.  
Some of the latest Working Papers are published full text (or abstract and content page) 
on the website: www.iss.nl (Research / Working Papers) 
 
  For further information contact: 
 ORPAS  -  Institute of Social Studies - P.O. Box 29776  
  2502LT The Hague - The Netherlands - FAX: +31 70 4260799 
 E-mail:  workingpapers@iss.nl  
 
ISSN 0921-0210 
   
CONTENTS 
CONTENTS 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1  INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................1 
1.1  Background context.........................................................................................1 
1.2  Prominent poverty reduction programs in the 1980s and 1990s.....................2 
1.3  Social Investment Funds .................................................................................3 
1.4  Conditional Cash Transfers.............................................................................4 
1.5  Objectives, scope, methodology and limitations of the research....................6 
1.6  Research questions and hypothesis .................................................................7 
1.7  Structure of the paper......................................................................................8 
2  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK..............................................................................8 
2.1  Understanding social safety nets: two central concepts..................................8 
2.2  Understanding policy options........................................................................10 
2.2.1  The criteria approach to policy analysis............................................10 
2.3  Understanding policy choices .......................................................................12 
2.3.1  Factors that shape decision-making...................................................13 
2.4  Linking options and choices..........................................................................14 
3  SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUNDS: THE CASE OF BOLIVIA.............................15 
3.1  Genesis and evolution of an acclaimed program...........................................15 
4  CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS: THE CASES OF MEXICO AND 
BRAZIL..................................................................................................................21 
4.1  Mexico’s Progresa........................................................................................21 
4.2  Brazil’s Bolsa Escola ....................................................................................25 
5  ASSESSING SIFS AND CCTS THROUGH THE CRITERIA FRAMEWORK..27 
5.1  The claims versus the evidence regarding SIFs ............................................28 
5.2  CCTs: a different story than SIFs?................................................................34 
6  SIFs, CCTs AND THE LENSES OF POLICY CHOICE......................................41 
6.1  SIFs: the creation and replication of the Bolivian model..............................41 
6.2  CCTs: understanding their emergence and popularity..................................43 
7  CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................46 
7.1  Key parallels and differences between SIFs and CCTs ................................46 
7.2  SIFs and CCTs as policy choices..................................................................48 
7.3  Final remarks.................................................................................................49 
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................51 
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CCT   Conditional  Cash  Transfer 
CEPAL  United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
ESF    Emergency Social Fund (Bolivia) 
FPS     National Productive and Social Investment Fund (Bolivia) 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
IDB    Inter-American Development Bank 
ILO    International Labor Organization 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
MEC    Ministry of Education (Brazil) 
NEP     New Economic Policy (Bolivia) 
NGO    Non Governmental Organization 
PAN    National Action Party (Mexico)  
PRI    Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico) 
Progresa Program  of  Education,  Health and Nutrition (Mexico) 
Pronasol  National Solidarity Program (Mexico) 
SEDESOL  Ministry of Social Development (Mexico) 
SIF   Social  Investment  Fund 
UN   United  Nations 
UNDP   United Nations Development Program 
US   United  States 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  context 
Poverty and vulnerability are enduring problems in Latin America. Although 
some countries attained significant growth in the past, widespread inequalities in the 
distribution of income and opportunities have persistently excluded large proportions 
of the population from the benefits of economic development. 
These problems were exacerbated in the 1980s when the debt crisis led to a 
deep economic recession in the region and the beginning of structural adjustment 
programs. Income per capita declined in most countries, while cuts in public 
expenditure affected the provision of social services negatively, leading to an increase 
in poverty and inequality. The early 1990s saw slight recoveries, but the contagion 
effects of the Mexican crisis in 1995 and the Asian crisis in 1997 brought a new wave 
of recession. Thus, despite some progress in proportional terms, the absolute number 
of poor in Latin America is on the rise, exceeding 211 million in 1999 (CEPAL 2002). 
 
TABLE 1 
Latin America and selected countries—incidence of poverty and extreme poverty 
(1979-99) 
 
 Year  % households 
below poverty line 
% households below 





















































Source: CEPAL 2000 and CEPAL 2002 
a/ 8 department capitals and the city of El Alto 
 
 
1 The aggregate levels of poverty in Latin America are linked to the region’s 
economic performance and patterns of social provisioning. At the individual level, 
however, there is an interplay of characteristics that increase the possibilities of falling 
and remaining in poverty. Age, gender, location, occupational status and sector are all 
important determinants of income poverty, but a number of studies have identified 
schooling as the strongest correlated variable (Fizbein and Psacharopoulos 1995; 
CEPAL 2002). 
This correlation has serious implications in a region where broad levels of 
access to basic education are counterbalanced by dramatic repetition and drop-out rates. 
These rates are positively correlated with the socioeconomic status of students. In 
general, poorer students tend to repeat more grades and drop out earlier from school 
than their better-off colleagues. And the economic reasons associated with school drop-
out can be particularly aggravated in periods of economic recession. 
Besides the direct costs of schooling, children’s opportunity costs can be 
significant. Since the most abundant asset of the poor is labor, the usual coping strategy 
for economic shocks among poor households is the intensification of female and 
children’s participation in the labor market. Both might end up leading to school drop-
out, either because the child needs to engage in full-time income-earning activities 
herself or because, in the absence of adequate childcare services, older children must be 
pulled out of school to look after younger siblings (IDB 2000). Thus, a vicious circle of 
poverty is established and children born in poor households might have few chances to 
escape this intergenerational trap. 
 
1.2 Prominent  poverty  reduction  programs in the 1980s and 1990s 
The persistence of high poverty rates in Latin America and worsening social 
conditions after the start of structural adjustment brought poverty concerns to the policy 
agenda with renewed impetus. At the same time, the main donors and international 
organizations shifted their focus to this topic, contributing to the creation and 
dissemination of safety net programs in the region. Two of these programs are 
discussed in this paper: social investment funds (SIFs) and conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs). 
SIFs and CCTs were not devised to replace the myriad of social policies 
involved in poverty reduction. Rather, they were meant to be targeted components of a 
broader strategy, cushioning the effects of the economic crisis on the poor. In this sense, 
2 their importance is related to the absence of widespread social security coverage in the 
region, the typical safety net choice in richer countries. 
Also, their visibility is not linked to their size, since they are typically much 
smaller than universal programs both in terms of expenditure and coverage. It has more 
to do with the attention they received among governments and donors alike, which 
resulted in their replication across several countries in a relatively short time span. As 
such, in distinct moments of the recent past, SIFs and CCTs came to occupy quite a 
central place in the development agenda of Latin America. 
 
1.3  Social Investment Funds 
By the late 1980s, most Latin American countries had structural adjustment 
underway, but there was growing awareness on the social costs of these programs. Not 
only would anticyclical measures of social protection provide necessary cushion 
mechanisms, they could also contribute to minimize the growing opposition to the 
adjustment process itself. This was the context in which SIFs emerged (Cornia 2002). 
SIFs were put in place in several countries with support from the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). They rapidly became their typical 
prescription for the fears of growing social exclusion in Latin America, due to the 
serious economic problems of the region and the inability of existing social programs to 
reach vulnerable populations.
1 They were devised as temporary safety nets, generally 
targeted at the poor, based on demand-driven projects. Despite great variation in terms 
of scope and functioning, cost-sharing with beneficiaries, administrative autonomy, 
decentralization and community involvement were their key operational elements 
(Glaessner et al. 1994). 
Although their initial focus was mainly one of providing safety nets, SIFs 
evolved over time towards a greater emphasis on developing infrastructure and access 
to social services for disenfranchised communities. Thus, they attempted to move 
from purely compensatory measures towards more structural poverty alleviation, 
enlarging their scope from the ‘adjustment poor’ to the chronic poor (Cornia 2002). 
The Bolivian Emergency Social Fund,  set  up  in 1986, was the first initiative of 
                                                 
1 According to Cornia (2002), at least 21 SIF-type programs were launched in Latin America since 
1986. Their proliferation grew exponentially, from one experience in 1987 to five in 1990 and 10 in 
1992. 
3 this kind. Primarily funded by international organizations, the ESF was transformed into 
a permanent government agency in 1991. Its focus evolved from a temporary 
employment program amidst laid-off miners of state-owned enterprises to one of 
promoting several schemes of social protection in poverty-stricken areas. It later moved 
towards the construction of health and education infrastructure and, finally, it was 
directed at supporting the decentralization process initiated in Bolivia in the mid-90s. 
The multiplicity of objectives of SIFs, their multisectoral approach and their 
constant evolution make any kind of impact assessment a complex task. In terms of 
providing a safety net for the poor, it seems that the results of SIFs have been modest 
(Stewart and van der Geest 1995). They have been more successful in providing 
infrastructure to poor communities than in generating additional employment and 
income. Participation of the poor in the projects was usually limited to providing 
unqualified and low-paid labor, since most of the skilled jobs were given to outside 
private contractors (IDB 2000). Moreover, under the requirement that community-
designed projects compete for the funds, those with well organized community-based 
organizations or capable local governments were the ones more easily selected 
(Stewart and van der Geest 1995). 
There were also complex institutional issues involved in the operation of SIFs. 
As they were set up as independent agencies, in order to ensure rapid disbursements and 
operational efficiency, potential tensions with line ministries and duplication of efforts 
could emerge (Cornia 2002). And as most SIFs relied heavily on external funding, there 
were considerable issues related to financial and institutional sustainability. 
 
1.4  Conditional Cash Transfers 
Although SIFs are still in place in most countries of the region, from the mid-
90s onwards a new policy trend emerged in Latin America: the provision of cash 
transfers conditioned on certain behaviors of the recipients. 
While it is true that this type of program was initiated in small-scale at the local 
level, it was only after the negative macroeconomic effects of the Asian crisis that they 
became widespread in the region.
2 Despite this similitude in  origin, the  scope of  CCTs 
                                                 
2 The Federal District and the municipality of Campinas, in Brazil, started CCTs as early as 1995, being 
followed by several local programs in that country before the first nation-wide CCT appeared in 
Mexico. 
4 differs from SIFs by addressing demand-side constraints for structural poverty 
reduction. This is done through an incentive scheme which combines the short term 
objectives of safety nets with the long term goals of building human capital and 
breaking the vicious intergenerational circle of poverty traps. As such, CCTs aim at 
responding to two interrelated problems: the failure of universal social policies in 
reaching the poor (especially in the areas of education and health) and the failure of the 
social protection systems in place to provide effective cushion mechanisms during 
crises. 
The operation of CCTs consists in the provision of money subsidies to targeted 
households, provided they assure school attendance of their school-aged children and, 
in some cases, make periodic visits to health centers. With this demand-side 
perspective, CCTs attempt to more effectively bridge the basic approaches to social 
policy identified by Drèze and Sen (1991): protection from deprivation and promotion 
of capabilities. 
The Mexican Program of Education, Health and Nutrition – Progresa – was the 
pioneer national CCT experience, set up in 1997. The Brazilian federal program Bolsa 
Escola (School Stipend) was created in 2001 and, in absolute numbers, is the largest 
CCT in place, benefiting more than five million households. 
Although originated with domestic funding both in Mexico and in Brazil, this 
type of program has received substantial support from the international community. UN 
agencies and development banks are unanimous in highlighting CCTs as one of the 
‘best practices’ of social protection in Latin America. This support is not only 
rhetorical, but also practical as considerable funding has been given to the 
dissemination of program experiences, expansion of existing initiatives and replication 
of similar programs elsewhere. To date, there are records of at least nine countries with 
large-scale CCT programs in the region, either being formulated or already under 
implementation.
3
The appeal of CCTs has much to do with their potential to tackle one key issue 
in the perpetuation of poverty in Latin America (i.e. educational attainment) and their fit 
into the current mainstream discourse on poverty reduction. Elements such as gender, 
human capital, community participation, empowerment and means-tested targeting are 
                                                 
3 CCT-type programs are present in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Guatemala and El Salvador have initiated small-scale pilot projects. 
5 all included, to varying degrees, in CCT programs. But, there are high administrative 
requirements associated with the set up of conditional subsidies. There can also be 
significant political economy issues involved in these programs and potential conflicts 
between the counter-cyclical nature of safety nets and the natural trend of transfers to be 
perceived as permanent entitlements. 
In terms of results, CCTs are quite recent initiatives, but initial evaluations have 
shown positive effects on school enrollment and nutrition patterns (Morley and Coady 
2003; Guerrero 2001; Sedlacek et al. 2000). The impact on child labor seems smaller, 
since school attendance can be frequently combined with work (Bourguignon et al. 
2002). The impact on poverty reduction is still not so clear. In the short run, the 
magnitude of effects on poverty rates varies by program, with Progresa yielding the 
most significant results. In the long run, the translation of higher educational attainment 
into higher earnings cannot be taken for granted, as it is mediated by the quality of the 
education received, rates of employment, absorption of skilled labor in the economic 
structure and general rates of return to education (Bourguignon et al. 2002; CEPAL 
2002). 
In sum, CCTs are no panacea, but their potential seems undeniable. They have 
become a fairly popular policy option in Latin America and their appeal seems to cut 
across political parties and ideological affiliations. In comparison with SIFs, they seem 
to be gaining considerably greater visibility and support from Latin American 
governments and the multilateral development community. 
 
1.5  Objectives, scope, methodology and limitations of the research 
This study explores why CCTs have come to occupy a central place in the 
poverty reduction agenda of Latin America. In this task, it follows a comparative 
perspective with the previous fashion of SIFs. The focus is not on the impacts of these 
programs, but on policy design and process. It may seem too early to assess the 
achievements of the multiple objectives of CCTs, especially the long term ones, but an 
understanding of their particular characteristics, selected implementation aspects and 
contextual factors helps to explain their recent prominence in the region. 
Methodologically, the study approaches SIFs and CCTs through a policy 
analysis framework and three selected cases: the Emergency Social Fund and its 
successors (Bolivia), Progresa (Mexico) and Bolsa Escola (Brazil). The choice of the 
Bolivian and Mexican experiences are related to their pioneer character, which served 
6 of inspiration for the design of similar programs in other countries. In the condition of 
‘best practices’, these interventions have been the object of quite a number of studies 
and the abundance of material is certainly an additional explanation for their choice. 
The large scope of the Brazilian program and the relatively little attention it has 
received from the academic community makes it an interesting object of study.
4
A wide range of secondary sources are used throughout the paper, but there is 
one important limitation. Since CCTs are very recent initiatives, with considerable 
support from the donor community, most studies and reports have been published as 
grey literature, either by governments or international organizations. This material tends 
to highlight all the good things about CCTs, with little information on their potential 
problems, making it more difficult to convey an objective overview. 
Additionally, there are huge challenges involved in the comparison of two 
different kinds of programs being implemented in different periods and within distinct 
social contexts. The scope of the paper prevents a thorough assessment of the 
particularities of each experience and a detailed analysis of the national realities in 
which they took place. Inevitably, not all aspects of the programs can be considered and 
important intervening factors might be neglected. Nonetheless, a systematic qualitative 
assessment provides indicative answers for the questions raised here. 
 
1.6  Research questions and hypothesis 
The main research question around which this paper is organized is: 
Why have conditional cash transfers become prominent in recent social 
safety net constructions and poverty reduction strategies in Latin America? 
My hypothesis is that: 
The central place of conditional cash transfers is related to:  
a) particular aspects of the design and implementation of these programs, 
which helped to overcome the shortcomings of existing and previous 
mechanisms; and 
b) domestic and external factors that shaped policy choices towards their 
creation and replication. 
 
                                                 
4 The extensive research on the Mexican experience is closely linked to the initial design of the 
program (as a perfect experiment, so as to allow the measurement of impacts) and to a thorough 
assessment contracted by the Mexican government with internationally renowned researchers. 
7 Subsidiary questions addressed by the paper are: 
•  Did anything go wrong with SIFs or are CCTs just a ‘better idea’? 
•  What are the pros and cons of CCTs and SIFs in theory? 
•  What administrative, political economy and institutional factors are in-
volved in the implementation of both types of intervention? 
•  What are the main stakeholders’ view on CCTs and SIFs? 
•  What are the stated and implicit objectives of these programs? 
•  What results have CCTs yielded so far? Are these any better than 
SIFs? 
 
1.7  Structure of the paper 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 clarifies central 
concepts related to social safety nets and depicts the policy analysis framework used. 
Chapter 3 introduces the case of the Bolivian SIF experience. Chapter 4 describes the 
cases of the Mexican Progresa and the Brazilian Bolsa Escola. Chapter 5 provides a 
criteria assessment of SIFs and CCTs. Chapter 6 analyses the factors related to the 
emergence of these programs in the context of the cases studied and their subsequent 
popularity in the region. Finally, chapter 7 concludes with a summary of main 
findings and remarks. 
 
 
2 ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK 
This chapter explores the key concepts related to social safety nets, presents a 
criteria framework to understand policy options such as SIFs and CCTs, and describes 
factors that might explain why these programs have come about in their particular 
contexts. 
 
2.1  Understanding social safety nets: two central concepts 
Two key interrelated concepts permeate the discourse of multilateral organiza-
tions and the academic literature on social safety nets: poverty and vulnerability. 
Understood as a multidimensional phenomenon, poverty encompasses 
multiple deprivations that go beyond low income and consumption. Lack of 
education, low health and nutrition status, inadequate housing conditions, 
8 powerlessness and voicelessness are all important aspects of poverty (World Bank 
2001a). This definition goes beyond the narrow economic view of well-being as 
synonymous to ‘utility’ and embraces the notion of capabilities and functionings 
developed by Amartya Sen (1987). 
Although widely recognized, this multidimensional perspective is not always 
put into practice, as it is not easy to measure and quantify. A few composite indicators 
of poverty and well-being have been developed, but they do not encompass the more 
intangible aspects of the phenomenon. Therefore, policy prescriptions are often based 
on proxy indicators related to living conditions or income poverty measures derived 
from a poverty line approach. These simplifications, while failing to capture important 
features of what it is like being poor, can be useful tools for research and policy since 
they allow comparisons over time and space and help establish thresholds for public 
action. 
Vulnerability, in turn, broadly refers to the higher exposure of the poor to risks 
and/or to the absence of individual or social instruments to mitigate these risks and 
help the poor cope with their aftermath (World Bank, 2001a). It also refers to the 
possibility of the near poor falling into poverty in the presence of a shock or economic 
downturn. The latter carries the notion of ‘transient poverty’, in contrast with ‘chronic 
poverty’ which is usually associated with longer duration and persistence. 
Thus, vulnerability is simultaneously a cause and a symptom of poverty. As 
such, it is a dynamic concept that brings the notion of risk-management into play. 
Every person is subject to uncertainties and events outside one’s control. Ill health, 
natural hazards, unemployment and macroeconomic crises are common examples. 
Since deprivation goes hand in hand with precarious livelihoods and dwellings, the 
poor are often more exposed to these risks than the better-off. Also, the ability of 
those with less savings and assets to deal with such crises is much more restricted. If 
there are no effective policy mechanisms of preventive and protective nature, external 
shocks can be devastating. And this is precisely the rationale behind the development 
of safety nets. 
Although the emphasis on vulnerability highlights the need for social protec-
tion, poverty reduction encompasses two aspects. The prevention of declines in living 
standards, particularly during crisis, is one side of the coin. But the enhancement of 
normal living conditions is crucial to go beyond remedial interventions and eradicate 
9 persistent deprivation. Drèze and Sen (1991) call these two aspects ‘protection’ and 
‘promotion’. 
While analytically useful, this distinction might be blurred in real life. 
Protection and promotion are interdependent and have mutual reinforcements. Thus, 
effective anti-poverty strategies will necessarily address both. 
 
2.2  Understanding policy options 
The comparison of policy alternatives is a central instrument of policy 
analysis. In order to be carried out systematically, it requires the establishment of 
clearly specified criteria of assessment. This comparative exercise can be undertaken 
at distinct stages of the policy process, with different purposes. In the policy 
formulation stage, it can provide guidelines for identifying the best suited 
interventions for a particular problem. During or after implementation, it can provide 
useful insights into positive and negative aspects related to the continuity or 
popularity of certain policy choices in a specific context. 
 
2.2.1  The criteria approach to policy analysis 
There is a myriad of criteria in the literature of policy analysis. They range 
from objectively quantified measures to more qualitative and subjective judgments. 
The framework proposed by Patton and Sawicki (1996) contains a useful typology 
comprising the most commonly applied criteria under four basic categories: 
a) political  feasibility
5
b) administrative  operability 
c) technical  feasibility 
d)  economic and financial possibility 
Political feasibility is related to the distribution of costs and benefits of poli-
cies across different groups in society. It is also concerned with the motivations, val-
ues and relative power of the actors involved, since these factors influence potential 
reactions. Its central element refers to the acceptability of particular policy options to 
                                                 
5 The original framework proposed by Patton and Sawicki adopts the name ‘political viability’ for this 
category. However, political feasibility is a more widely accepted term in the field of policy analysis 
and seems to be more appropriate for this paper. While feasibility refers to what is possible to achieve 
given existing power structures and stakeholders, viability, in a strict dictionary definition, refers to 
what is able to work as intended, thus carrying an implicit dimension of success. 
10 key stakeholders and their ability to facilitate or block initial adoption or successful 
implementation. 
Administrative operability involves capability issues related to the 
implementing agency, as well as institutional commitment and support. It is closely 
linked to implementation success, as it uncovers the actual prospects and bottlenecks 
for bringing a policy out of paper and into the real world. It involves both concrete 
and quantifiable measures related to financial resources, staffing and equipment, as 
well as more intangible and subjective assessments related to organizational support, 
processes and values. 
Under the category of technical feasibility, there are two key elements: 
effectiveness and adequacy. While effectiveness is a measure of accomplishment of 
objectives, adequacy is an assessment of the appropriateness of the objectives 
themselves. As such, adequacy is concerned with the extent to which a particular 
policy is in line with the problem to be solved, i.e. the fit between problem and 
proposed solution. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is close to an impact analysis of 
outcomes and, as such, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Economic and financial possibility is related to the comparison of costs and 
benefits of a policy. In a world of scarce resources and competing priorities, economic 
criteria usually have a prominent role in policy analysis. Furthermore, the appeal of 
allegedly precise quantification and measurement has contributed to make this type of 
criteria rather dominant in the field. However, economic and financial aspects will not 
be directly addressed here, since cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses require 
quantitative techniques which are also out of the scope of this study. 
In principle, this criteria framework is of a general nature. It could be applied 
to any kind of policy. Grosh (1995) advanced this framework by providing specific 
criteria which are relevant for the analysis of safety nets and poverty-reduction pro-
grams. This specific framework overlaps with some of the categories proposed by Pat-
ton and Sawicki, but it includes two additional criteria: collateral effects and accuracy 
of targeting. 
The first is related to indirect impacts of the intervention, which can be nega-
tive, positive or neutral. (Dis)incentive effects for private transfers or labor supply, 
externalities and participation in other programs are some common examples of col-
lateral effects. Accuracy of targeting, in turn, is related to the extent of inclusion and 
11 exclusion errors, i.e. to the undercoverage of the poor or the leakage of program bene-
fits to the non-poor. 
On the basis of these five central criteria (political feasibility, administrative 
operability, adequacy, collateral effects and targeting), this paper develops a critical 
assessment of both SIFs and CCTs, taking into account issues related to the design of 
these programs, as well as concrete implementation aspects presented in the literature. 
 
2.3  Understanding policy choices 
The framework proposed by Grindle and Thomas (1991) for the analysis of 
policy reform in developing countries is a useful tool to understand the factors behind 
the popularity of CCTs as a policy choice in Latin America in the late 1990s, follow-
ing the prominence of SIFs in the previous period. According to it, policy change is a 
continuous process affected by many intervening variables. Particularly relevant are 
the environmental context of the policy, its agenda-setting circumstances and specific 
characteristics. 
Decision-making, although closer to a series of formal and informal steps than 
to a single moment in time, does not happen in isolation from the environment. 
Historical, political, institutional and bureaucratic contexts combine with the 
background characteristics and perceptions of decision-makers to create the 
boundaries of policy-making.
6
Within this environmental context, there are broadly two types of circum-
stances for the setting of policy agendas: crisis or ‘politics as usual’ situations. Crises 
are perceived as such when outside actions or events bring imperatives of immediate 
reaction, impinging ‘pressing problems’ upon governments. In contrast, policy-
making in normal times is concerned with ‘chosen problems’, picked up by decision-
makers because of their values and preferences. These two agenda-setting circum-
stances entail different dynamics in terms of decision-making and implementation. 
In any case, implementation, a crucial determinant of policy success or failure, 
does not follow automatically from decision-making. On the contrary, getting a policy 
out of paper involves communication, bargaining, clearance points, compliance and 
resources. Unexpected reactions may cause delays or even turn a policy into a 
symbolic initiative, with no practical effects whatsoever. When the stakes involved 
                                                 
6 The terms decision-makers, policy-makers and policy elites are used interchangeably. 
12 are high, reactions might have drastic political consequences that challenge the 
survival of the regime in power itself. 
But before implementation takes place, decision-makers shape their choices 
according not only to the environmental context and agenda-setting circumstances, 
but also to particular ‘lenses’ used to assess policy options. 
 
2.3.1  Factors that shape decision-making 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) identify four basic ‘lenses’ which shape policy 
choices: technical advice, bureaucratic implications, political stability and support, 
and international pressure and leverage. 
Technical advice is a central element of the rational model of decision-
making. It gained importance as the world of policy-making grew in complexity and 
interdependence, resulting in the increasing absorption of technocrats in middle and 
high-ranking bureaucratic positions, as well as the influence of consultancy services 
from universities, think tanks and, particularly in developing countries, international 
organizations. 
Policy decisions are also affected by concerns on their implications in terms of 
power, prestige and budgets of the bureaucratic constituencies represented by 
decision-makers. Bargaining, rivalries and competition among government agencies 
might bear significant impacts in decision-making. Individual career considerations 
also matter. Policy-makers are frequently inclined to support policies that enhance the 
relative position of their organization or that contribute to their own professional 
ambitions. Less ‘mundane’ issues, such as administrative capacity, might also filter 
this process. 
The same applies to concerns related to political stability and support. Every 
alternative entails a certain distribution of costs and benefits across different groups. 
How supporters of the regime are affected can have a considerable weight in the 
considerations of policy elites. On the other hand, options that present clear threats to 
the stability and survival of the regime and the particular leadership in power are 
seldom consciously adopted. As such, explicit or implicit political criteria might help 
explain choices that do not conform easily to purely technical analyses. 
Last, but certainly not least, are considerations related to international pressure 
and leverage. This element grew in importance after the introduction of structural 
adjustment programs in most of the developing world in the 1980s. Since then, the 
13 conventional expertise power of international organizations and bilateral donors has 
been enlarged by the ‘power of the purse’ in terms of loans, access to credit and trade 
relations. Nevertheless, Grindle and Thomas (1991) caution against a simplistic view 
of this element and argue that most policy reforms do not result from external 
imposition. For them, the role of international organizations and the implications of 
particular options on a country’s relationship with them is only one of the elements 
that national decision-makers take into account when assessing options. Still, in their 
empirical evidence, international leverage, as well as technical advice, turned out to 
be more relevant than initially expected. The particular context of the 1980s, marked 
by complex debt negotiations and structural adjustment gave these elements a much 
higher prominence. As the same pattern might have endured in the 1990s, the 
importance of this element should not be underestimated. 
These four lenses seem to be useful tools to explain the genesis and popularity 
of both SIFs and CCTs across Latin America, in the particular contexts where these 
programs emerged. Based on their stories in Bolivia, Mexico and Brazil, this paper 
attempts to distinguish the factors that shaped policy elites’ decisions towards adopt-
ing these programs and the particular circumstances in which these decisions took 
place. 
 
2.4  Linking options and choices 
While the criteria framework provides a tool for assessing particular design 
and implementation aspects of CCTs and SIFs, the lenses that shape policy-makers’ 
choices bring a dimension of process into this paper. These two sets of analytical tools 
are used separately in the following chapters, but it is worth noticing that some of 
their components are related in mutual reinforcements and overlaps. 
For instance, the criterion of political feasibility is closely connected to the 
lenses of political stability and support. Underlying both concepts are the notions of 
constituencies and stakeholders. Administrative operability, in turn, is linked to 
bureaucratic implications, as organizational capacity and institutional commitment 
permeate them. Adequacy is primarily a function of technical advice, since the fit 
between problem and response depends on precise diagnostics for policy formulation. 
Targeting is simultaneously related to bureaucratic implications (in the sense of 
capacity), technical advice (in terms of accuracy) and international leverage (as 
donors are its notorious advocates). 
14 With these multiple relationships in mind, the analytical framework of this 
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3  SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUNDS: THE CASE OF BOLIVIA 
This chapter presents the SIF experience of Bolivia, which pioneered this kind 
of intervention in 1986. It traces the origins and evolution of the temporary 
Emergency Social Fund (ESF) into its permanent successors, exploring their implicit 
and explicit rationales, features and results. 
 
3.1  Genesis and evolution of an acclaimed program 
The early 1980s were a time of deep economic crisis in Bolivia, as in most of 
Latin America. Foreign capital flows dried up, government deficits increased 
significantly and GDP fell steadily. By 1984, after a decline of more than 20% in 
                                                 
7 Context-specificity is a defining characteristic of this framework. Weights to the different criteria and 
lenses might vary from case to case and no expected outcomes can be automatically inferred from it. 
Thus, it functions as an organizing tool for the review of SIFs and CCTs undertaken in this paper.
15 GDP per capita since the start of the decade (Grosh 1995), the country faced an 
annual inflation rate of 24,000% and widespread shortages, leading to extensive 
popular discontent around major cities (Jorgensen et al. 1992). 
The same period was marked by political unrest and frequent changes in the 
government. Between 1981 and 1982, three successive military governments 
struggled with Bolivia’s growing problems (US Department of State 2002). 
Democratic transition was completed in 1982, but the civilian president chosen by 
Congress called early elections to relinquish power one year before the end of his 
term (Graham 1992). 
In 1985, a new government, led by Victor Paz Estensoro, took office and 
immediately put in place a comprehensive structural adjustment program to stabilize 
the economy and resume growth (US Department of State 2002). The package, known 
as the New Economic Policy (NEP), had the support of the multilateral financial 
institutions and included the typical orthodox measures of trade liberalization and 
deregulation, radical cuts in state expenditure and privatization of public enterprises. 
It was quite successful in taming hyperinflation, which fell to 11% in 1987 (Jorgensen 
et al. 1992), but its effects on long term economic recovery are still to be seen. 
Adjustment was far from painless. Restructuring the state-owned tin mines led 
to the retrenchment of 23,000 miners, 77% of their workforce (Jorgensen et al. 1992). 
The economy stagnated and workers had to rely increasingly on the informal sector 
(Graham, 1992). General food subsidies were eliminated and fiscal austerity 
prevented full recovery of social spending (Jorgensen et al. 1992). Social issues 
ranked low in the initial priority agenda of macroeconomic stabilization. 
Although there is considerable controversy if the negative social effects 
experienced during the NEP were the result of the earlier economic crisis or the 
adjustment process itself, there was a widespread perception that the already critical 
social conditions in Bolivia were deteriorating
8 and a wave of popular protests, led by 
the laid-off miners, shook the capital city of La Paz (Jorgensen et al. 1992). 
In this context, Paz Estensoro’s government realized that addressing social 
issues was critical for the survival of the NEP and, ultimately, to his cabinet’s own 
                                                 
8 In 1985, living conditions in Bolivia were (and still are today) the worst of South America. For 
instance, the infant mortality rate was 110 per 1,000 live births, the double of the regional average. 69% 
of the urban population had access to piped water (often not drinkable), while this proportion reached 
only 10% in rural areas (Jorgensen et al, 1992). 
16 political survival (Jorgensen et al. 1992). A visible and quick policy response was 
needed, and, as the public pockets were empty, international assistance was essential. 
Discussions were initiated with the World Bank, so as to design a short term 
mechanism to compensate the losses of adjustment and protect the poor until growth 
resumed (Jorgensen et al. 1992). The Emergency Social Fund (Fondo Social de 
Emergencia) was the solution that emerged.
9
The ESF was set up as a three-year program (later extended to four and a half). 
It was created by executive decree and placed under the direct supervision of the 
president’s office (Glaessner et al. 1994). Its objectives were the provision of short-
term employment to those most affected by adjustment and basic social services to the 
poor in a moment of reduced government capacity (Graham 1992). Basically, the ESF 
was a financial intermediary that would provide funding for small projects in four 
areas: economic infrastructure (mostly construction or upgrading of roads or 
irrigation), social infrastructure (construction or rehabilitation of schools and health 
posts), social assistance (nutrition programs and immunizations), and productive 
support (microcredit schemes). However, as the main initial emphasis of the fund was 
employment-generation, 87% of its funding was directed to labor-intensive 
construction projects (Jorgensen and van Domelen, 2001). 
TABLE 2 
Portfolio distribution of ESF projects (1986-91) 
Economic Infrastructure  44% 
Social Infrastructure  43% 
Social Assistance  9% 
Productive Support  3% 
Source: Jorgensen and van Domelen (2001) 
The novelty of the ESF was its institutional design and modus operandi, which 
became the distinguishing and commonly  praised  features of most social funds put in 
                                                 
9 Jorgensen et al (1992) give a vivid account of the World Bank involvement in the set up of the ESF, 
describing it as ‘joint venture’ between the Bolivian government and the donor community. It was the 
first World Bank intervention addressing the ‘social costs of adjustment’, in a moment when strong 
criticism on the negative impacts of adjustment on the poor and the slowness of the Bank to act upon it 
was rising. 
17 place in Latin America after the Bolivian model. The ESF was a small, semi-
autonomous agency, granted with several exemptions from conventional public sector 
management (salary scales, hiring and firing procedures, procurement and 
disbursement rules etc). This was intended to allow private sector-like operations, 
with results-oriented teams and high quality management (Siri 1996). Quick 
disbursements and efficient operations, in a context of weak institutional capacity in 
line ministries and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, were the expected 
results. An innovative computerized management information system was a key factor 
in this sense and contributed to the ESF procedures being considered ‘transparent’ and 
‘technical’ (Jorgensen et al. 1992). 
Moreover, the ESF was a demand-driven organization, in the sense that it fi-
nanced projects chosen by the beneficiary communities themselves. These projects 
were presented through local governments, NGOs or grassroots organizations and 
their execution was usually carried out by private contractors (Glaessner et al. 1994). 
According to the World Bank experts who took part in the set-up of the ESF (Jorgen-
sen et al. 1992), ideological and practical reasons were behind this choice. A demand-
driven approach was in line with the dismantling of what was considered a ‘paternal-
istic’ state and could strengthen initiative and self-reliance among the population.
10 It 
also allowed the ESF to remain a small and flexible organization, contributing to the 
ownership of the projects by the communities. This particular aspect of the funds, and 
the public-private partnerships it ensued, came to be praised as the basis of an innova-
tive model of service delivery, in line with the New Public Management doctrine 
(Tendler 2000). 
Since the focus of the ESF was to get fast results, refined targeting 
mechanisms were not implemented. Funding goals were established for each Bolivian 
department and for the four programmatic areas, but targeting was done on a project-
by-project basis through a discretionary appraisal of the ESF staff. But since the fund 
was mostly geared towards construction projects with low wages, the ESF was 
supposed to attract poor workers. The project menu was also supposed to benefit the 
poor through the provision of infrastructure to long neglected communities (Jorgensen  
                                                 
10 When the ESF was created, participation was not a ‘hot’ topic in the development agenda yet (Abott 
and Covey 1996). As this concept became mainstreamed, the alleged demand-driven approach of most 
SIFs was additionally praised as participatory and empowering, as they relied on communities’ choices. 
18 et al. 1992). As the ESF evolved into more permanent institutions, targeting remained 
a key operational issue and initiatives to establish geographical criteria for resource 
allocation (i.e. poverty maps) were attempted. 
A final key characteristic of the ESF, shared by most SIFs in Latin America, 
was its high reliance on donor funding. Although the initial operations were funded by 
the Bolivian government, so as to assure a fast start for the program, the ESF had 
more than 87% of its resources from foreign donors. Among those, around US$38.9 
million came from the World Bank and roughly the same amount from the IDB (IDB 
1998). 
In total, the ESF financed more than 3,000 projects (Jorgensen et al, 1992) and 
generated nearly 20,000 persons-month of full employment at its peak (IDB, 2000). 
Estimates account for 1.2 million beneficiaries of the infrastructure provided, in a 
population of less than seven million when the ESF was implemented (IDB, 2000). 
Camacho (1998) argues that in 1990 the number of jobs created by the ESF equaled 
1.8% of the economically active population and almost 1/3 of unemployed workers. 
According to him, the fund had a macroeconomic impact of 1.1% of GDP in that year. 
By 1989 the ESF approached the end of its temporary mandate. National 
elections were close and the fund faced increased attempts of politicization at central 
and local levels (Graham 1992). At the same time, it was clear that adjustment was by 
no means finished, chronic poverty remained extremely high and economic recovery 
was taking much longer than initially foreseen. The successes of the ESF were well 
acknowledged, but awareness on its shortcomings was also arising. Issues of 
coordination of the fund’s activities with sectoral ministries, sustainability of the 
projects financed, inaccurate targeting and a much too narrow focus on low-cost 
activities with high employment spin-offs were being highlighted (Stewart and van 
der Geest 1995; Jorgensen et al. 1992). Discussions among the Bolivian government 
and the donors centered around three options: extend the ESF indefinitely, terminate 
the program or replace it by a permanent institution with a more limited mandate 
(Jorgensen et al, 1992). The latter was the alternative that prevailed and the ESF was 
transformed into the Social Investment Fund (Fondo Social de Inversión). 
The SIF focused exclusively on projects in health and education, with the 
objective of contributing to Bolivia’s long term growth through human capital 
formation (Jorgensen et al. 1992). The focus on these areas was justified not only by 
their undeniable importance for growth, but also by the perverse combination of 
19 serious coverage deficits in poor areas and the weak institutional and investment 
capacity of the responsible line ministries (Glaessner et al. 1994). With this 
transformation, once again the Bolivian model set the pace for most SIFs in Latin 
America, as they moved away from income-generation towards longer term objectives 
(Cornia 2002). 
The functioning of the new SIF did not differ much from the ESF, although 
there was greater emphasis on coordination with line agencies, explicit cost-sharing 
requirements and geographic targeting. Most projects were related to infrastructure or 
equipment provision to disenfranchised communities. Its magnitude was more limited 
though. Up to 1994, the SIF accounted for 0.38% of GDP and 4.5% of social expendi-
tures, in contrast with 0.72% and 11% in the case of the ESF throughout its mandate 
(Cornia 2002). 
During the 1990s, the Bolivian SIF received considerable support from foreign 
donors and became more integrated with other national policies. By mid-decade, as 
Bolivia started a comprehensive decentralization program, it acquired an important 
role of capacity-building at the local level (Camacho 1998). 
In 2000, the fund was again transformed into a new institution: the National 
Productive and Social Investment Fund (Fondo Nacional de Inversión Productiva y 
Social). The basic features of the SIF were retained but the FPS has a much stronger 
role in the decentralization process to municipalities. Also, it is structured to finance 
the priority areas identified in the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The 
projects, however, can only be requested by municipal governments, which appears to 
be a step back in terms of direct community participation. In any case, the 
FPS’mission statement does not depart completely from the initial ESF objectives: ‘to 
channel social and productive investment through conditioned transfers of resources 
to municipal projects, ... , so as to generate employment and reduce poverty’ 
(Government of Bolivia 2003). 
20 4  CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS: THE CASES OF MEXICO AND 
BRAZIL 
This chapter describes the large scale conditional cash transfers implemented 
in Mexico and Brazil, since 1997 and 2001 respectively. It analyses the general 
features of these programs and the context in which they emerged. 
 
4.1 Mexico’s  Progresa
11
In August 1997, President Ernesto Zedillo launched the first CCT program to 
be implemented in a national scale. Zedillo had taken office in December 1994, 
amidst a political and economic turmoil (Menocal 2001). The country was facing a 
time of high profile political assassinations and kidnappings, growing corruption and 
violence associated with drug trafficking. In that same year, a leftist uprising had 
emerged in Mexico’s poorest state. And Zedillo himself had no strong backing from 
his own party, the all-powerful Institutional Revolutionary Party—PRI, which had 
ruled the country since the 1920s blurring the boundaries between the party and the 
state. He was a second choice candidate, who replaced the candidate chosen by the 
party and assassinated during the campaign. 
Only a few weeks after Zedillo’s inauguration, the crash of the Mexican peso 
reversed the patterns of economic recovery from previous years, leading the country 
to a severe crisis. The downturn had tremendous contagion effects for the whole of 
Latin America and resulted in Mexico’s recurring to a bail-out from the IMF and the 
US under conditions of austerity as harsh as the first years of structural adjustment 
(Yaschine 1999). 
Therefore, Zedillo’s initial concerns were focused on achieving some political 
and economic stability for the survival of the regime. He took a series of 
decentralizing reforms at all levels, with the aim of redistributing some power 
traditionally overconcentrated in the presidency and dissociating his administration 
from the widely condemned practices of corruption and patronage of the PRI. In the 
social policy realm, these reforms meant the dismantling of the highly politicized SIF-
like program created by his predecessor, Pronasol, and the transfer of 2/3 of its budget 
to states and municipalities (Menocal 2001). 
                                                 
11 In 2002, the Mexican government transformed Progresa into a new program called Oportunidades 
(Opportunities). The basic features of Progresa were maintained, but its coverage and scope were 
expanded so as to reach urban areas and achieve greater coordination with other initiatives. 
21 A consistent anti-poverty program at the federal level took some time to 
emerge and the first years of Zedillo’s administration were commonly accused of a 
social policy vacuum (Yaschine 1999). Finally, in 1997 Progresa was launched as an 
innovative and apolitical program for poverty reduction. It was a targeted initiative, 
aiming at replacing the highly regressive and urban-biased general food subsidies in 
the country (Scott 1999). 
The innovation of Progresa was related to its integrated approach to alleviating 
extreme poverty and promoting human development. It consisted on cash and in-kind 
transfers to beneficiary households, conditional on school attendance by the children 
of those families up to the age of 18 and regular visits to health centers by all its 
members. 
Through its educational component, the largest one in budgetary terms, 
Progresa granted bimonthly cash benefits for each one of the beneficiary children 
enrolled in grades 3-9, up to a maximum amount per family, and additional cash 
support for school material to primary school students. Its health component 
combined primary health care, informative sessions and periodical check-ups for 
individuals of beneficiary households. The nutrition component included cash 
transfers and nutrition supplements to under-five children, pregnant and lactating 
women (SEDESOL 1999).
12 Although the program had a much smaller budget than 
Pronasol, the size of the transfers was not small and varied from US$10 to US$60, 
depending on the program component and the beneficiary children’s grade and gender 
(Ayala 2003). Skoufias et al (2001) point out that the cash transfers provided by 
Progresa averaged 20% of the prior income of the recipients and might have had a 
non-negligible impact on the local economies of the areas served. 
Besides this integrated approach, Progresa had a positive gender bias, for the 
cash benefits were addressed to the female heads of the recipient households. 
Moreover, the value of cash transfers for secondary students was around 15% higher 
for girls than for boys, in a clear recognition of the higher risks of drop-out faced by 
them (CEPAL 2002) and the positive externalities generated by higher female 
educational attainment. 
                                                 
12 Oportunidades expanded the educational subsidies to upper secondary students and included a 
savings component for this group. 
22 The apolitical claims of Progresa were related to its targeting and transfer 
mechanisms, intended to eliminate the discretional management of public funds of 
which previous programs had been commonly accused. The selection of recipient 
households was carried out in three steps (Skoufias et al. 2001). First, communities to 
be targeted by the program were selected on the basis of a composite measure of 
deprivation derived from census data. This provided the criteria for a geographical 
targeting to highly deprived areas.
13 The second step consisted in the selection of 
beneficiary households within the targeted communities, on the basis of household 
surveys. The central criterion used in this step was the household income per capita, 
which was compared to a poverty line based on the costs of a basic food basket. Other 
socioeconomic characteristics of the household (such as size, composition, assets, 
occupation and educational status) were used as discriminants in a statistical method 
of scoring. The final step of targeting in Progresa involved an element of community 
participation: before their actual inclusion in the program, the list of selected 
households was presented in a community meeting which should review the accuracy 
of the selection. 
As for the actual transfers, they were directly addressed from the national 
program coordination to recipients, without intermediation through state or municipal 
budgets. Beneficiaries would collect their transfers every other month in organizations 
contracted for this purpose, such as post office branches or banks. 
Progresa adopted a gradual approach to implementation. At its start, it was 
implemented in eleven states and benefited 300,000 families in rural areas. In 2002, 
already under the name of Oportunidades, the program reached more than 4 million 
households in all 31 Mexican states, including urban areas (SEDESOL 2003). Its 
coverage today represents around 20% of the Mexican population (Rawlings and 
Rubio 2003). 
                                                 
13 But a high score in this index might not be sufficient to bring a community into the program. It had 
to be coupled by the actual existence of education and health services in that region, so as to allow 
beneficiary households to meet the conditionalities inherent to Progresa. 
23 TABLE 3 
Evolution of Progresa’s coverage 1997-2002 
  Municipalities  Households 
1997 357  300,705 
1998 1,750  1,930,032 
1999 2,155  2,306,325 
2000 2,166  2,455,783 
2001 2,317  3,237,667 
2002 2,354  4,240,000 
Source: SEDESOL (2003) 
In organizational terms, Progresa was set up as an inter-institutional program 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Social Development. At federal level, the 
Ministries of Education and Health and the Mexican Institute for Social Security were 
involved in its operation. The program also required a network of interlinkages and 
cooperation with state and municipal governments for its implementation, as well as 
the participation of beneficiary communities themselves (Scott 1999).
14 In this sense, 
a key element in the operation of Progresa was the local promotora, a program 
participant selected by her fellow beneficiaries to function as a liaison between 
themselves and Progresa’s staff, providing information for both sides on operational 
aspects and problems (Adato 2000). 
The program’s budget, entirely funded by domestic resources, grew rapidly as 
Progresa expanded. In 2002, it reached US$1.8 billion, around 0.3% of the Mexican 
GDP (Ayala 2003). 
International recognition did not take long to arise, due to its innovative and 
alleged transparent features, as well as the evidence of positive impacts emerging 
from carefully planned evaluations. As a result, in 2002 the Mexican government 
contracted its largest loan ever from the IDB, totaling US$1 billion, for the purposes 
of expanding Progresa’s scope and coverage in the framework of the new 
Oportunidades program (IDB 2003a). 
Gradually, Progresa became the centerpiece of the targeted poverty reduction 
strategy in  Mexico.  As such, contrary  to  the  usual  policy  discontinuities  of  Latin 
                                                 
14 States are responsible for the delivery of health and education services in Mexico, thus representing 
the supply side of Progresa’s conditionalities. Municipalities had a limited role in assisting with 
Progresa’s activities at the local level (i.e. targeting, registration of beneficiaries, assemblies). 
24 America, the historic electoral defeat of the PRI in 2000 did not threaten its 
continuation, as the program was already well established and widely praised as a 
successful model in the development practice of Latin America. 
 
4.2 Brazil’s  Bolsa Escola 
Brazil’s main federal CCT program was preceded by relatively successful 
programs at the local level. Since the mid-90s, Brazilian municipalities had introduced 
cash transfers conditioned on school attendance with relatively good results and high 
visibility in the media. Sedlacek (2000) reported that in 1998 more than 60 local CCT 
programs were already in operation in the country, covering around 200,000 families. 
These programs varied in their primary focus (safety net or access to education), but 
their main features did not differ significantly from Progresa’s educational 
component. 
In 2001, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso was responsible for the 
introduction of Bolsa Escola nationally, building upon a smaller program which 
transferred resources for municipalities to implement their own CCTs. The economic 
context was not as negative as 1997 in Mexico, but the macroeconomic stabilization 
package which had been in place since 1994 was showing some shortcomings. 
Poverty, for instance, had shown decreasing patterns since the introduction of the 
plan, but it started growing again after 1999 (Lahóz 2002). Also, presidential elections 
were scheduled for 2002 and the political scenario for the right-center government 
party was quite unclear.
15
The proximity with the electoral race might help explain the speed with which 
Bolsa Escola was implemented. In February 2001, Cardoso launched the program 
through a presidential measure, with financial support from the newly created Fund 
for Eradicating Poverty.
16 By April, the program had been approved by Congress and 
became law. In one year of implementation, Bolsa Escola reached more than five 
million beneficiary households in around 5,500 municipalities (MEC, 2002a). This 
                                                 
15 Cardoso’s party candidate ended up losing the elections for the left-wing Luis Inacio Lula da Silva. 
16 This fund, expected to last until 2010, was created through a constitutional amendment with the 
objective of targeting resources to the poorest groups of the population. It was financed through a tax 
increase. 
25 coverage represents approximately 99% of the Brazilian municipalities and 11% of 
households, while the program’s budget is around 0.15% of GDP. 
Bolsa Escola grants monthly transfers to poor households with children aged 
6-15 enrolled in grades 1-8, on the condition that they have at least 85% of attendance 
in school. As in Progresa, the transfers are addressed to the female head of the 
household, with no intermediation through subnational budgets. But in the Brazilian 
case, the size of the transfers is smaller: around US$5 per child, up to US$15 per 
family. There are no variations on the transfers by age, gender or geographical 
location, but the decentralized fiscal arrangements in place in Brazil allow the national 
program to be combined with local ones. Thus, richer states and municipalities might 
top up the transfers or expand coverage. 
For the operation of the program, the government established a poverty line of 
US$30 per month per capita, half the minimum wage at the time when the program 
was established.
17 Estimates of the target population in each municipality were 
calculated on the basis of national household sample surveys, the population census 
and the annual school census, so as to determine numerical parameters of coverage. 
But the implementation of targeting at the household level was left to the municipal 
governments, with no detailed requirements of the federal administration other than 
the respect to coverage estimates. Thus, local practices for targeting have shown 
considerable variation. In some places, the identification of beneficiaries was handled 
by the schools themselves; some municipalities have implemented queuing as a self-
targeting mechanism; others reported to implement geographical targeting and 
household visits. In any case, a fairly sophisticated management and information 
system was developed to prevent multiple registers for the same household, but there 
seems to be repeated cases of exclusion of potential beneficiaries because the 
municipality had reached its coverage estimate (MEC 2002b). On the one hand, this 
problem might be related to failures in the estimates, which have proven to be quite 
sensitive depending on the data sources used and methodologies employed.
18 But on 
                                                 
17 As yet, Brazil does not have an official poverty line. The monetary threshold for participation in 
Bolsa Escola is annually established by the the government and despite small increases in the minimum 
wage after the program started, it has never been adjusted.  
18 Simões (2003) argues that a recalculation of coverage estimates undertaken by the federal govern-
ment in the second year of Bolsa Escola’s implementation showed variations of between 24% and 
143% across the Brazilian states, due to the use of different databases and methodologies. 
26 the other hand, they can be also due to the inaccurate targeting methods employed, 
which potentially cause significant errors of leakage and undercoverage. 
In order to participate in the program, municipalities have to create a 
community council of social control. This council should be made up of at least 50% 
of representatives from the civil society and is regarded as the main instrument for 
community participation in Bolsa Escola. Its tasks include the approval of the list of 
beneficiaries and the monitoring of attendance reports provided by schools. 
Bolsa Escola is coordinated by the Ministry of Education and the operation of 
the transfers is contracted out to a public bank with wide capillarity in the national 
territory, through its own branches or franchise outlets in local stores. This 
institutional location points out to the primary educational focus of the program. Its 
rationale was linked to the efforts of universalization of basic education in Brazil, the 
main goal of Cardoso’s administration in this area. In fact, net enrollment rates in 
grades 1-8, the mandatory education cycle, had increased from 87% to 96% from 
1994 to 1999 (MEC 2003) and Bolsa Escola’s main stated objective is to keep these 
children in school. 
The program was initiated with domestic resources, but by the end of 2001 a 
US$500 million loan had been contracted with the IDB for improving the program in 
respect to targeting, impact evaluation, institutional organization and management 
(IDB 2002).
19 More recently, already under Lula’s administration, the government 
took a step forward into combining Bolsa Escola and the other federal CCT programs 
under a single intervention, close to the integrated approach of Progresa.
20 Until this 
proposal gets implemented, Bolsa Escola remains the largest program of its kind in 




5  ASSESSING SIFS AND CCTS THROUGH THE CRITERIA 
FRAMEWORK 
This chapter outlines a critical assessment of SIFs and CCTs according to the 
criteria presented in chapter 2. The purpose is to identify design characteristics and 
                                                 
19 The loan is addressed not only to Bolsa Escola but also to the other federal CCT programs related to 
human capital development. 
20 This new program, entitled Bolsa Familia (Family Stipend), was launched in October 2003. 
27 implementation aspects which might explain their prominent role, paying attention at 
the same time to problematic issues and remaining challenges. 
 
5.1 The  claims  versus the evidence regarding SIFs 
The experience of SIFs has attracted significant attention in the development 
community. Donors have promoted enthusiastic support to these interventions, 
highlighting their advantages and successes. The IDB, while acknowledging a number 
of limitations of the SIF model in Latin America and the need to evolve towards a 
‘new generation’ of programs, stated that SIFs are ‘perhaps one of the region’s, and 
the Bank’s, most important contributions to development’ (IDB 1998: p. 1). The 
World Bank website features these programs as a new mode of low cost social 
delivery, which empowers communities through a demand-based approach (World 
Bank 2003a). 
Interestingly, these claims are based on a set of mixed evidence that does lead 
to straightforward conclusions. Evaluations show that the funds have serious 
limitations which cannot be easily overcome and their high ranking as a safety net or a 
new mode of infrastructure delivery for the poor cannot be automatically inferred 
(Tendler 2000). 
In terms of the five criteria that underlie the analytical framework of this 
paper, the design and implementation of SIFs also present mixed results. And the fact 
that the initial programs evolved into permanent institutions, with different scope and 
objectives, makes this assessment more complicated. Still, based on the Bolivian case, 
some general considerations can be drawn. 
Grosh (1995) argues that the political feasibility of SIFs is usually high, given 
that their demand-driven nature and streamlined procedures make this kind of 
intervention popular with beneficiaries. Local governments view SIFs as new sources 
of funding and workers value their job-generation features in critical economic 
periods. Political support from line agencies, on the other hand, might be much more 
problematic. SIFs have brand new budgets – which might be regarded as budgetary 
losses by the ministries in charge of their programmatic areas – as well as a special 
hierarchical position, operational autonomy, salaries above the public sector level and 
exemptions of normal bureaucratic procedures. 
According to Grosh (1995: p.173), the fund faced an initial resistance from 
other government institutions, which was overcome by ‘concerted efforts of the ESF’s 
28 managers’. A possible explanation of the ESF’s good standing against ‘bureaucratic 
jealousy’ is related to the strong political commitment it had from the top of the 
Bolivian government and the donors, which gave a significant amount of strength to 
the fund vis-à-vis other government agencies. The context in which it was created, of 
a perceived crisis with high stakes for the regime in power, might have contributed 
considerably for this. In addition, in terms of political economy, the creation of the 
ESF did not entail a set of direct and immediate losers. No budgetary redistribution 
was needed and no additional tax was levied to finance the program, which could 
count largely on external resources.
21
Moreover, the ESF, despite being subject to political manipulation in electoral 
periods, managed to work with actors of different parties at the local level, building a 
constituency basis across the country. Local politicians, even if from the opposition 
party of the national government, were able to take credit for ESF projects (Graham 
1992). In addition, as the focus of the ESF shifted from the most hit victims of 
adjustment (the retrenched miners) to the structural poor of long neglected 
communities, it was able to establish a much larger pool of stakeholders. In fact, 
Graham (1994) notes that the support of the ‘adjustment poor’ to adjustment measures 
is unlikely no matter the level of the compensation provided. For this reason, she 
suggests that redirecting resources to previously excluded groups might have higher 
payoffs for the government in the long run. The story of SIFs in Latin America is well 
fit to this finding, as most of them shifted their initial focus from the ‘new poor’ to the 
‘chronic poor’ residing in marginal areas. 
At the moment of the ESF creation, line agencies in Bolivia had serious 
institutional handicaps. For decision-makers, bypassing them seemed the only way to 
launch a fast and visible effort (Graham 1994). In this sense, Grosh (1995) considers 
that SIFs achieve excellence in the criteria of administrative operability, as they adopt 
private sector practices to overcome the red tape of traditional government programs. 
However, there might be important qualifications to be taken into account. For 
instance, the choice of an ‘add-on’ structure might seem easier in the short term than 
                                                 
21 That does not mean that ESF money was ‘costless’. Part of it came in the form of soft loans, which, 
although had smaller than usual market interest rates, meant an additional burden for the national debt. 
Other parts were grants, which were given on the basis of macroeconomic conditionalities. 
29 engaging in complex institutional reforms in the social sector (Stewart and van der 
Geest 1995). But it might cause a lack of coordination with sectoral ministries, 
entailing considerable difficulties in the long term sustainability of the infrastructure 
created. Subbarao et al. (1997) report this as a critical issue in the ESF, due to the 
perverse combination of its great level of autonomy and an excessive emphasis on 
yielding quick results.
22 Bypassing normal government structures in the Bolivian case 
was justified on the grounds of the urgent nature of the program and might have been 
a choice only appropriate at the temporary level (Fumo et al. 2000). Nevertheless, 
while the permanent SIF included some restraints for the ‘procurement heresy’ carried 
out by the ESF, retention of high quality staff depended on higher pay scales than 
those practiced by the public sector in general (Jorgensen et al. 1992) and most of the 
exemptions enjoyed by the emergency program were extended to its permanent 
successors. 
In organizational terms, the establishment of the ESF entailed the creation of 
an agency from scratch (Jorgensen et al. 1992). The support of the donors for this 
enterprise was essential, as the flow of foreign resources and technical assistance 
allowed the development of a modern and fully equipped agency. A well developed, 
computerized management and information system was created and much of the 
alleged transparency in the ESF’s operations is due to this tool, presumably absent 
from most government offices of the region at that time. However, the parallel 
schemes created by SIFs in Latin America generally made little progress in 
transferring their positive operational aspects to line ministries. They operated under 
very special circumstances and had relatively abundant resources, conditions that 
could not be easily replicated across the public sector (Cornia 2002). In fact, some 
authors argue that SIFs turned out to be potentially distracting factors for badly 
needed reforms in line ministries (Jorgensen and van Domelen 2001). 
Regarding the adequacy of SIFs as a policy response, there is no easy answer. 
The initial rationale of the ESF was to provide a short-term safety net in a time of 
serious economic crisis. Although the politically powerful laid-off miners were not 
the sole focus of the ESF, the visibility of this group as the most hit by adjustment 
                                                 
22 There is anecdotal evidence of schools that were built where there was only need of rehabilitation of 
existing classrooms, health posts that never had nurses allocated to them and so on. As the ESF was 
transformed into the SIF, stronger coordination was attempted, including formal consultation mecha-
nisms with line ministries in the stage of project appraisal. 
30 was a key motivation for starting an emergency social program. But, in practice, the 
ESF and its successors had poor results in generating additional income and 
employment in a sustained basis for the victims of economic shocks and the poorest 
people as well. While the miners were only 10% of the ESF workers (IDB 2000), 
individuals from the first and second deciles in the income distribution accounted for 
no more than 8% of those (Lustig 1997). Overall, wages did not represent the bulk of 
ESF money, totaling only 1/3 of the expenditures (Siri 1996). 
Lustig (1997) ironically called this type of program ‘the safety nets which are 
not safety nets’. She argued that, while most SIFs (Bolivia’s included) have stated 
objectives of safety nets, they tend to be created many years after crises started and 
incomes fell. Moreover, they fail to reach the poorest, because of their demand-driven 
nature. As such, their employment generation objectives, while always explicit, seem 
more rhetorical than anything else. And if the issue is smoothing income and 
consumption in times of economic downturn, SIFs might not be the appropriate 
intervention. 
On the other hand, SIFs fulfilled other relevant objectives. The provision of 
infrastructure in poor areas and the expansion of social services to previously 
neglected communities are particularly relevant in a context of tight austerity and 
reduced development expenditures. The support for decentralization and capacity-
building at the local level are equally important. As SIFs evolved towards longer term 
objectives, these were clearly identified as their comparative strengths. As such, SIFs 
appear to have been more adequate instruments to address chronic poverty, rather than 
transient deprivation. And this is by no means negligible, given the persistence of 
poverty in Latin America. 
As for targeting, SIFs face an inherent contradiction with their demand-driven 
nature.
23 If they are not complemented by effective outreach and capacity-building, 
SIFs tend to benefit relatively better-off communities. And even where poverty maps 
are in place to guide the geographical allocation of resources, there is no guarantee 
that the poorest individuals and households will benefit from the intervention (Fumo 
et  al.  2000).  In  this  sense,  the  results  of  the  Bolivian  experience  are  insightful. 
                                                 
23 In a study of SIFs’ operations in Northeastern Brazil, Tendler (2000) found that they were far from 
being genuinely demand-driven, but this defining characteristic of SIFs remains uncontested by the 
bulk of the literature.  
31 According to the IDB (2000), besides a clear under-representation of workers from 
the poorest deciles in the ESF, the poorest areas received comparatively smaller per 
capita expenditures (US$9.45, as opposed to US$23.97 in the least poor 
communities). Pradhan et al (1998) found that the Bolivian SIF’s investments in 
health and sanitation tended to benefit better-off households. Similarly, Fumo et al 
(2000) argued that its education expenditures were skewed toward better-off 
communities with active NGOs. 
The focus on the provision of infrastructure also contributed for excluding 
women from the jobs created. SIFs have not consistently included a gender dimension 
and the construction sector traditionally hires male workers in Latin America. The 
ILO (2001) reports that only 3% of the direct beneficiaries of the ESF were women 
and the Bolivian SIF increased this number to around 10%. 
Finally, Grosh (1995) identifies the rehabilitation or expansion of Bolivia’s 
insufficient infrastructure and social services as clear collateral benefits of the ESF. 
However, this can be questioned, since employment generation and provision of 
infrastructure and social services were the very objectives of the fund itself. 
Community empowerment through capacity-building for local governments, NGOs 
and grassroots organizations seems to be a less disputed collateral advantage of this 
type of intervention. 
In sum, the mixed score of SIFs in this criteria analysis is depicted below: 
 
TABLE 4 
Summary matrix: Assessing SIFs through the criteria framework 
  Positive aspects  Negative aspects 
Political 
feasibility 
No immediate losers and support from top 
government, donors, staff, beneficiaries/local 
governments.  




Speed, autonomy and resources  Problems of inter-institutional 




Good record in provision of infrastructure to 
disenfranchised communities 
Poor safety net mechanism  
Poor record of employment and 
income-generation for target 
groups 
Targeting 
Introduction of poverty maps (allocation of 
resources to poor areas, not necessarily to 
poorest individuals) 
Leakage and undercoverage 
effects, related to demand-based 
approach and gender bias 
Collateral 
effects 
Local capacity-building    
 
32 Although this analysis benefits from an ex-post perspective with a clearer 
understanding of positive and negative aspects, one would expect decision-makers to 
have applied a somewhat similar framework to opt for SIFs over alternative social 
programs and to decide on their continuity over time. Grosh (1995) describes this 
exercise in the process of creation of the ESF, comparing it with the alternatives that 
were devised in Bolivia at that time: general food subsidies, food stamps, food 
commodities distribution, school lunches and microenterprise credit schemes. 
In her analysis, SIFs outperformed all the other alternatives in most of the 
criteria used. General subsidies, while popular and administratively feasible, had 
preclusive costs and high leakage rates. Their elimination was included in the very 
adjustment package. Food commodities distribution was regarded as paternalistic and 
administratively complex. These same problems applied to food stamps, which 
entailed an additional difficulty: the psychological rejection to a nominally 
denominated stamp in a country that had just emerged from hyperinflation. School 
lunches would face the same objections as the food distribution mechanism and would 
not be able to reach the poorest, whose children were not likely to be in school. 
Finally, microenterprise credit schemes would not be administratively feasible on the 
scale required for visibility and impact. In this ex-ante analysis, the social fund 
alternative seemed to exceed other policy options. However, as argued in this chapter, 
the Bolivian SIF experiment actually ended up having mixed results. 
Despite this mixed score, the fact that the Bolivian social fund managed to be 
continually sustained in the 1990s draws attention to two important factors: its 
adaptability potential and the dynamics which surround the creation and perpetuation 
of government organizations. On the one hand, the high flexibility of the SIF 
mechanism as a financial intermediary allowed for its continuous transformation and 
redirection towards ‘new’ objectives, such as human development and 
decentralization. On the other hand, once created, government agencies build a 
constituency which might make it more difficult to dismantle. Beneficiaries are an 
important group in this sense, but they might not be vocal and organized enough to 
ensure continuity. The agency’s staff and local level partners might have more power 
in this sense, particularly when, as in the case of the ESF, they count on tangible and 
intangible donor support. 
However, one cannot say that the funds have the same degree of visibility and 
prominence today as they had by the early 1990s in Latin America. As much as 
33 donors might still direct resources to them, an attentive review of the most recent 
international publications related to poverty reduction shows that CCTs are now the 
typical ‘best practice’ of safety nets and social protection, influencing the 
development of a crop of similar programs in the region.
24
 
5.2  CCTs: a different story than SIFs? 
Since the assessment of SIFs through the five criteria used in this paper 
showed mixed results, it is worth exploring how CCTs score in this review. In this 
analysis, however, it should be noted that the two CCT cases discussed, despite 
sharing basic characteristics, show considerable differences in design and 
implementation. 
The political feasibility of CCTs seems to be quite high. Linking cash transfers 
to a certain desirable behavior highlights the co-responsibility of beneficiaries in their 
own well-being and a move away from the notion of paternalistic social assistance 
(Coady 2003). Perhaps due to the ideological proximity with the liberal welfare model 
of the US or the prevalence of a neoliberal macroeconomic framework in the region, it 
looks like Latin Americans in general have a strong negative view of policies which 
create dependence of recipients, rather than empowering them to do without state 
support (Grosh 1995).
25 At the same time, there appears to be a broad consensus on 
the ‘public’ nature of goods such as education or health (Graham 2002). In this sense, 
the fact that CCTs are related to poor children’s present living conditions and future 
human capital (with presumably positive effects in competitiveness) make them even 
more acceptable. They are seen as a way of helping the ‘deserving poor’ to escape 
poverty and, simultaneously, boosting the elusive phenomenon of sustained growth. 
In the particular case of Progresa, narrow targeting associated with the phasing 
out of general subsidies might have entailed opposition from potential losers, 
especially in the urban areas which were not initially included in the program. 
However, the negative general view on previous interventions (considered regressive 
and politicized),  the  limited  scope of Progresa and the lack of unity and organization 
                                                 
24 See, for instance: IDB (2000); CEPAL (2002); World Bank (2003b); World Bank (2003c); IDB 
(2003b). 
25 In exploring the results of a recent survey on public attitudes in the region, Graham (2002) argues 
that Latin Americans show striking similarities in perceptions of poverty with US citizens: around 36% 
of both groups state that poverty is due to lack of effort by the poor themselves. 
34 among potential losers might help explain why this opposition did not block the 
program’s introduction. And eventually Progresa was expanded so as to cover the 
urban poor as well. Unfortunately, no detailed information on these issues was found 
in the course of this study, so one can only make general speculations about these 
possible tensions. 
In the case of Bolsa Escola, the program was favored by a national consensus 
on the top priority of education in the development agenda of Brazil, built throughout 
the years of Cardoso’s administration. Moreover, the successes of local CCT 
programs had been widely disseminated by the media, which contributed to an 
increasing degree of support from policy and economic elites to this kind of 
intervention. Finally, the decentralized operation of the national program allowed 
municipalities to share the credit for it and manage a crucial political instrument: the 
identification of beneficiaries at the local level. 
Regarding administrative operability, CCTs might entail considerable costs 
and capability requirements, especially in their initial set-up. These programs involve 
relatively complex mechanisms for targeting and logistics for the delivery of transfers, 
besides the need of good coordination with service providers in health and education 
for the tasks of monitoring and supervision. As they expand, however, there can be 
economies of scale, which might contribute to keep overall administrative costs low 
(Morley and Coady 2003).
26 The complexities related to the set-up phase, however, 
are a possible explanation for their initial introduction only in middle-income 
countries. As CCTs expand to poorer countries and broaden their scope in the original 
programs, they rely increasingly more on external funding and design (Ayala 2003). 
The recent IDB loans to Brazil and Mexico illustrate this point, as well as other 
externally funded CCT experiences in Latin American countries inspired by the 
Mexican initiative.
27
                                                 
26 Detailed cost information is only available for Progresa. According to Morley and Coady (2003), 
administrative costs averaged 9% of total program costs, of which around 30% were related to 
household targeting and 5% to geographical targeting. The remainder of administrative costs reflects 
monitoring of conditionalities compliance, delivery of transfers and follow-up operations. 
27However, Morley and Coady (2003) make the point that CCTs are a fairly affordable and effective 
anti-poverty intervention, which do not require complex bureaucracies, except for initial set-ups, and 
need little international technical assistance for design or management (as the home-grown experiences 
of Mexico and Brazil show). 
35 Integration of CCTs in line ministries’ activities was the way pursued in 
Mexico and Brazil. While this might increase prospects of sustainability and 
institutionalization of these programs, important administrative challenges remain. 
For instance: cost-effective mechanisms for monitoring the compliance of 
conditionalities, which are at the same time timely and accurate, still need to be 
designed. Coady (2003) outlines the difficulties of this task, as households and service 
providers alike face incentives to report compliance, either because of the 
consequences of benefit withdrawal, in the first case, or because of community 
pressure and control mechanisms of excessive demand, in the second group. Also, no 
clear formula seems to be in place to determine the optimal amount of the transfers. In 
Mexico, the differentiated size of transfers by age and gender signals an attempt of 
covering the opportunity costs of children’s education; but in Brazil the flat subsidy at 
a rather low value indicates an attempt to maximize the number of beneficiaries across 
the country. In the same way, there are no consistent rules and procedures being 
followed for the inclusion of new beneficiaries in already served communities or for 
the exclusion of recipients after a certain period of permanence in the program and/or 
due to improvements in their socioeconomic status.
28 Although these issues point out 
to administrative obstacles, they are also closely connected to political economy 
considerations, which affect the program’s political feasibility. Not only might 
recertification of beneficiaries create tensions with current recipients, it can also lead 
to considerable budgetary redistributions across states, a particularly sensitive issue 
for federal governments (Morley and Coady 2003). 
In terms of adequacy, CCTs have the advantage of tackling several problems 
in a single policy. They can effectively provide additional income to poor households, 
as they employ direct transfer mechanisms to beneficiaries. They also have significant 
impacts on human capital in general and schooling in particular, the single most 
important determinant of poverty in Latin America. For instance, a synthesis of 
Progresa’s results provided by Coady (2003) shows that the program yielded 
significant impacts on the nutrition of infants, improved the health status of 
beneficiaries of all ages and increased school enrollments by 7-9%, particularly in the 
transition for lower secondary education, a common point of student drop-out. These 
                                                 
28 Progresa’s regulations establish recertification of beneficiaries every 3 years, but as yet these 
procedures have not been implemented. Bolsa Escola’s regulations, on the other hand, are silent on this. 
36 human capital gains are relatively permanent, yielding benefits long after the transfers 
have ceased (Székely 2001). 
Also, since CCTs are handed out in cash, they entail less transaction costs than 
in kind transfers. And the direct transfer to the mothers might bring efficiency gains, 
for they presumably have better information on family needs than governments 
(Ayala 2003). 
Nevertheless, as much as these programs try to bridge important gaps in social 
provisioning for poor households, they can only be an adequate solution where no 
supply biases and geographic barriers exist. In this sense, CCTs are cheaper than 
school building, for instance, but they can only work where schools already exist and 
are able to respond to the increase in demand that these programs might generate. 
Thus, CCTs can only be complements to broader social provisioning, never 
substitutes. As such, a crucial question that remains refers to the need of 
conditionalities in the first place. The assumption behind CCTs is that poor 
households would not automatically choose to invest in human capital, but this cannot 
be taken as given. Would the same impact of CCTs not be obtained through 
unconditional transfers combined with significant improvements in the delivery of 
social services? While this might be a logical question on the viewpoint of adequacy, 
the criteria of political feasibility (acceptability to the general population) and 
administrative operability (introducing a new program, even if complex, might still be 
easier than reforming existing supply-side policies) might help explain the inclusion 
of conditionalities in their design. 
According to Morley and Coady (2003), as a safety net mechanism, CCTs 
might not be adequate to shield the poor from temporary macroeconomic shocks or 
natural disasters, as cyclical contractions or expansions are sensitive issues. Rather, 
they appear to be an effective mechanism to boost social development by tackling one 
structural cause of poverty. Other emergency safety nets have to be in place for short-
run causes of deprivation, as well as different structural factors related to it. And even 
as an incentive for human capital accumulation, CCTs face an inevitable trade-off 
between their two central goals: education and poverty reduction. If beneficiaries are 
limited to subgroups with low enrollments, the educational impacts of these programs 
will be more significant, but the aggregate poverty impacts will be smaller due to 
greater undercoverage rates. Conversely, as more beneficiaries are included, more 
transfers are addressed to groups who already have high enrollment rates, thus 
37 minimizing educational impacts. This trade-off is particularly important for middle-
income countries, like Brazil and Mexico, which have significant poverty indices and 
high enrollment rates. Progresa illustrates this tension clearly, as it started trying to 
limit eligibility so as to maximize the investment impact of the program in human 
capital, but was eventually expanded to urban areas, where half of the Mexican poor 
live, but where enrollment rates were already high. 
This trade-off is linked to the issue of targeting, which needs two separate 
assessments. One for what CCTs state in theory, another for what is really done in 
practice. In theory, CCTs strive for the most accurate targeting to the poor. Progresa 
combines geographical targeting with proxy means tests and community participation 
so as to identify its beneficiaries. Bolsa Escola, in turn, adopts a poverty line approach 
and community control to targeting. From the start, however, both programs incur in 
undercoverage of poor households, as Progresa does not serve areas unattended by 
health and education services (usually the remotest communities) and Bolsa Escola 
excludes families without children in school as well as marginal groups outside 
conventional households, such as street children. 
In practice, the targeting mechanisms employed have serious flaws. Although 
studies show that poor households receive twice as much in Progresa than they would 
in the absence of targeting and that Progresa’s methodology outperform other 
targeting methods (Coady et al. 2002; Skoufias et al. 2001), community reviews have 
not taken place as originally envisioned. According to a study carried out by Adato 
(2000), only selected beneficiaries were informed of the meetings, while non-
beneficiaries were generally not encouraged to attend (Adato 2000). As such, these 
community reviews might function as legitimizing instances for the previous 
“scientific” steps of targeting, instead of fulfilling their role of transparency, 
participation and accountability. Moreover, the general perception on Progresa at the 
grassroots level was of an unfair targeting system, where ‘needy’ households were 
excluded and, to a lesser extent, not so ‘needy’ ones were included. This evidence 
might  suggest  that  there  are  some  problems  in the implementation of the targeting 
38 methods of Progresa.
29
In Bolsa Escola, the problems are even more serious, as there were no agreed 
procedures for municipalities to implement targeting and the control at the federal 
level comprised only consistency checks on the number of beneficiaries through local 
aggregate indicators of affluence (Bourguignon et al. 2002). Thus, there could be 
significant room for political patronage and leakage of benefits, especially considering 
the speed with which the program was implemented. 
In relation to collateral effects, one can consider the general positive impacts 
of CCTs on women. Addressing the transfers to the female heads of households was 
mainly motivated by previous evidence on better prospects for translating resources 
into higher levels of well-being for the children if those were controlled by the mother 
instead of the father. But this design component additionally contributed to 
empowering women beneficiaries, who had their role in household decision-making 
increased by receiving the transfers, participating in the programs’ activities and so on 
(Adato et al. 2000; Coady 2003). There can be also positive multiplier impacts on the 
local economies of areas served by CCTs.
30 In Brazil, two additional collateral effects 
have been generally highlighted: incentives for civil registration (as official 
documents are required for the mothers to collect the transfers) and increased access 
of the poor to the financial system (as beneficiaries receive the transfers through 
magnetic cards of individual bank accounts). 
But CCTs also entail costs to beneficiaries and their communities. At the 
individual level, there are private costs in terms of time and money for households to 
meet conditionalities and collect transfers, which again affect particularly women. At 
the community level, Adato (2000) reports adverse impacts of household targeting on 
social relations, which might undermine community cohesion and solidarity. There 
have been also reported problems of abuse of power on the part of the community 
promotoras, as well as teachers and health personnel, who are responsible for 
                                                 
29 The main reason mentioned for exclusion errors referred to the use of household surveys. Some of 
the poor people were not at home when the survey enumerator passed by; others did not answer the 
survey because they did not know its purpose; others overstated their resources because they were 
ashamed of their own degree of poverty; finally, there were cases where the respondents did not 
understand the questions because of language problems (a great part of Progresa’s target population 
belong to indigenous groups). 
30 On the negative side, cash transfers might create inflationary pressures in the communities where 
they operate, but the evidence from Progresa’s evaluations does not point in that direction (Handa et al. 
2001). 
39 reporting compliance to the conditionalities. Scott (1999) argues that this problem 
could be significantly aggravated since teachers or nurses tended to be also 
promotoras, due to their higher levels of capacity and community involvement. The 
new Oportunidades program is trying to address this issue, by replacing the individual 
promotoras for local committees. 
To conclude, the performance of CCTs in this criteria analysis is depicted 
below: 
TABLE 5 
Summary matrix: Assessing CCTs through the criteria framework 
  Positive aspects  Negative aspects 
Political 
feasibility 
Conceptual design in line with general 
perceptions on poverty  
Room for political maneuver at local level 
(Bolsa Escola) 
 
Opposition by potential losers 
from replacement of universal 




Coordination with line ministries  Complex targeting and logistics, 
unresolved operational issues  
Adequacy 
 
Effective income transfers with multiple 
impacts on human capital and efficiency 
gains  
Potential for structural poverty reduction 
through human development 
 
No substitute for supply-side 
intervention and emergency 
safety nets 
Trade-off between goals (poverty 
reduction x education) 
Targeting 
Design focus on the poorest 
 
Operational problems in practice 
Collateral effects 
Gender impacts and multiplier effects in 
local economies 
Increase in civil registrations and access 
to financial system for the poor (Bolsa 
Escola) 
Private and social costs 
 
On balance, CCTs seem to exceed SIFs in some of the criteria, like 
coordination with line ministries, gender impacts and targeting (at least in theory). But 
they still present some problems and challenges in terms of design and 
implementation. Based on a purely rational analysis, they appear to be attractive 
social programs, which presumably scored better than possible alternatives considered 
by the governments of Brazil and Mexico at the time of their introduction. Since no 
published information describes the decision-making processes that took place in 
these countries, a detailed discussion of this aspect cannot be pursued without access 
to primary data. Hypothetically, however, at least one clear alternative was at hand for 
policy-makers: not introducing any new social program. In this sense, governments 
40 could have chosen to boost existing education or health interventions with the funding 
that was used to start up Progresa and Bolsa Escola. While this option could seem 
easier than designing whole new programs, it was likely to be less visible as well and 
focus only on supply-side issues. 
All in all, the reasons behind CCTs’ popularity might not be related only to 
their basic characteristics. The next chapter elaborates on this observation by applying 
the lenses proposed by Grindle and Thomas (1991) in order to understand how these 
programs emerged and got replicated. 
 
 
6  SIFS, CCTS AND THE LENSES OF POLICY CHOICE 
This chapter discusses the factors that appear to have shaped the policy 
choices leading to the creation of SIFs and CCTs in the cases studied and which might 
also explain why these programs were replicated across Latin America. As 
highlighted in chapter 2, some elements included here overlap with the criteria 
assessment of the previous chapter. Nevertheless, the focus of this section is 
somewhat different, as it is concerned with policy process. Although decision-makers 
might apply a similar criteria analysis to make their policy choices, not all aspects of a 
program are thought through before implementation takes place. Also, according to 
the environmental context and agenda-setting circumstances, stakeholders might value 
each criterion differently, giving more weight to one or another. The purpose of this 
chapter, therefore, is to go one step beyond the negative and positive aspects of SIFs 
and CCTs, in order to understand other intervening factors that explain their 
emergence and popularity. 
 
6.1  SIFs: the creation and replication of the Bolivian model 
The context in which the ESF was created in Bolivia was not ‘politics as 
usual’. The deep macroeconomic crisis and the harsh adjustment measures put in 
place to deal with it could have serious political consequences for the government. 
The stakes were high and the top executive officials realized that failure to launch a 
fast and visible action in the social area could threaten the survival of the regime 
itself. A ‘pressing problem’ was pushed on the policy agenda and several alternatives 
were considered by the Bolivian government before the decision to create a social 
fund was taken (Grosh 1995). 
41 In this process, it seems that all the four factors identified by Grindle and 
Thomas (1991) have shaped decision-making. Technical advice was central in 
devising an appropriate policy response and weighing the implications of the different 
alternatives considered (Grosh 1995). The World Bank had a particularly important 
contribution in this sense, as it took a central role in the Bolivian debate on social 
issues by the time the ESF was devised and assisted in the detailed design of the fund 
(Jorgensen et al. 1992). 
Concerns related to political stability and support led policy elites to strive for 
a program that would compensate the ‘social costs of adjustment’. Although attempts 
to benefit the loudest victims (the laid-off miners) through the ESF can be considered 
quite unsuccessful, the fund managed to build support for the government and 
ultimately for structural adjustment (Graham 1992). Cornia (2002) argues that the 
ESF and subsequently the Bolivian SIF did not compensate the falls in social 
expenditure of the adjustment era. However, as they reached long neglected 
communities and developed positive partnerships with traditionally hostile NGOs, 
they were crucial instruments in maintaining the sustainability of the adjustment 
process (Graham 1992). 
Bureaucratic implications were also important. As the institutional capacities 
of social ministries were rather weak, the government opted for a program that would 
be implemented by a new, autonomous organization. Bureaucratic jealousy existed, as 
the fund had a privileged position vis-à-vis line ministries, but donor support to the 
new agency might have been crucial to overcome this. Bolivia had a record of poor 
implementation of donor-funded projects and it was unlikely that donors would agree 
to channel a great flow of foreign capital through the existing organizations 
(Jorgensen et al. 1992). 
Finally, in accordance with the empirical findings of Grindle and Thomas 
(1991), international leverage appears to have been a key factor. The support of 
donors was essential for the ESF, as the Bolivian government had a huge public 
deficit and was undergoing tight austerity measures. The World Bank was involved in 
the decisions leading to the creation of the ESF since the beginning and this was a 
decisive element to gather support from the other multilateral and bilateral donors 
(Jorgensen et al. 1992). 
International leverage also appears to be the key element explaining how the 
SIF experiment spread from Bolivia to the rest of Latin America and a large number 
42 of developing countries in other regions.
31 Abbot and Covey (1996: p.6) argue that the 
ESF ‘...produced a core of Bank personnel who now specialize in SIFs and move from 
project to project, taking their original model with them’. Tendler (2000) sustains that 
SIFs’ popularity is related to the way big donors function, rather than to the funds’ 
institutional innovations or results. In this sense, she characterizes the popularity of 
SIFs as ‘supply-driven’. Officials of large donor organizations find SIFs more 
satisfying to work with than traditional government organizations, since they are 
faster and more open to donor monitoring and influence. Also, SIFs promote self-
reinforcing ties between national governments (who see these interventions as 
effective instruments to get extra international resources) and donor bureaucrats (who 
suggest SIFs as complements to larger, and often bitter, structural adjustment 
lendings). Since the early 90s, donors invested a considerable amount of resources in 
creating and supporting a pro-SIF network across the globe, as SIF professionals share 
experiences in international meetings and learn about other SIFs best practices. As 
such, SIFs were converted into a successful ‘development narrative’ with an 
appealing and straightforward blueprint for action. Thus, if in Bolivia a combination 
of domestic and external factors contributed to the creation of the ESF; in other 
countries international leverage seems to have been the decisive factor for the 
introduction of SIFs. 
 
6.2 CCTs:  understanding  their emergence and popularity 
It is difficult to assess if the emergence of CCTs in Brazil and Mexico took 
place in as dramatic a context as the one in Bolivia in 1986. The Mexican crisis of 
1995 had very serious proportions, but by the time Progresa was started, the country 
had already overcome its most drastic aspects. Similarly, when Bolsa Escola was 
initiated, Brazil was facing a downturn, but due to the macroeconomic stabilization 
achieved the situation was nonetheless better than the devastating crisis of the 80s. 
Still, the region as a whole was plunged in a repetitive circle of small recoveries 
followed by downturns. In this context, what are the factors that seem to have shaped 
decision-makers choices towards CCTs? 
                                                 
31 Tendler (2000) accounted for more than 40 countries with SIF-like projects implemented since 1986, 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe. 
43 Electoral concerns seem to have had a marked importance in both countries. 
Cash transfers establish a direct and regular link between the government and 
beneficiaries and Bolsa Escola could make this very visible, through a magnetic card 
which reached five million households one year before presidential elections. Thus, 
the logic of the program seems to have been to preserve or win votes for the 
government party through the maximization of the number of beneficiaries, even if 
the amount of the transfers was kept rather low. As for Progresa, although the 
program was launched in the middle of Zedillo’s term, its greater expansion in 
coverage took place in the two years that preceded elections. While the program’s 
implementation showed some positive changes in relation to the clientelistic practices 
of previous interventions, Menocal (2001) shows that its expansion did not follow 
only poverty indices; it had a political rationale behind it. The government set up a 
strategy of winning votes through establishing a wide network of beneficiary 
households in PRI-dominated states and ‘punishing’ (by smaller coverage expansions) 
states dominated by the main opposition challenge in the presidential race, the 
National Action Party (PAN). 
Therefore, it seems that the lenses of political stability and support played a 
key role in the creation of CCTs, although in a different way than SIFs. The stakes 
involved were not the survival of the regime per se, but the maintenance of the 
government parties in power, given the limits set by the democratic game. 
Interestingly, in Brazil and Mexico alike, the government candidates lost the electoral 
races, but, as mentioned above, this development did not compromise the continuity 
of both CCT programs studied.  
Besides political considerations, technical advice seems to have played an 
important role in shaping the decisions which led to the creation of CCTs. Previous 
studies and research had already shown the correlations between human capital and 
poverty, as well as the synergies between the components of these programs. Their 
complex operational design, especially Progresa’s, resulted from a careful process of 
trial and error and pilot tests (Scott 1999; Yaschine 1999). The inclusion of an 
experimental evaluation in the initial design of the program illustrates the importance 
of technical advice in this process, as Progresa addressed one of the most common 
44 shortcomings of social programs in developing countries: the lack of reliable and 
systematic data for impact assessments.
32
Bureaucratic implications do not appear to have had such a high prominence 
as in the design of SIFs. Both Progresa and Bolsa Escola were integrated into existing 
line ministries, as regular government programs. The acceptable capacity levels of 
central ministries in middle-income countries might be related to this, since later CCT 
initiatives implemented in different settings have followed the solution adopted by 
SIFs: they were placed in departments directly linked to the top executive office 
(Ayala 2003). 
International pressure and leverage, in turn, appear to have had a smaller role 
in the original creation of CCTs than SIFs’. Coady (2003) and Yaschine (1999) point 
out that the design of Progresa was ‘home-grown’, although the World Bank and the 
IDB had important roles in encouraging discussions and facilitating meetings between 
program designers and international experts in the conception stage of the program. 
The fact that Progresa was fully financed by domestic resources signals in the same 
direction. It is the same with Bolsa Escola: the federal program was mostly inspired 
by local initiatives, rather than international advice, and it relied solely on government 
financing. 
However, international leverage seems to be the key factor explaining the 
replication of these initiatives in other countries in a relatively short time span (the 
Colombian Families in Action program, created in 2001, the Nicaraguan Social Safety 
Net, created in 2000, and the Honduras Family Allowance program, transformed into 
a CCT in 1998, are just a few examples). If the innovative characteristics of CCTs 
matched many of the concerns of the international agenda on poverty (like 
participation, gender, safety nets, human development), the visibility of these 
programs to the international donors was enhanced by at least two other factors: their 
scientifically ‘proven’ results (which were made possible by the experimental 
evaluation of Progresa) and the close links of the program’s designers with the 
                                                 
32 There was heated debate on the ethical grounds of maintaining a control group excluded from 
Progresa, just for the sake of evaluation. The government justified this choice on the grounds of 
budgetary constraints and the control group was eventually covered by Progresa’s expansion. Still, this 
initial design seemed to cater more for the interests of researchers and policy-makers than for the poor 
themselves. 
45 multilateral financial institutions.
33 This visibility, in turn, accounts for the high 
popularity of these programs elsewhere, as additional loans and funds are made 
available for governments willing to implement them. Moreover, it is translated in 
considerable efforts of dissemination, as donor agencies increasingly adopt the 
approach of intermediaries for the diffusion of ‘best practices’ and the sharing of 
experiences among developing countries. As CCTs figure prominently among reports 
of development organizations and international conferences and meetings, a body of 
CCT specialists emerges and the same supply-driven effects that contributed to the 




Through a comparative approach with SIFs, this paper explored the reasons 
for the recent prominence of CCTs in the poverty reduction agenda of Latin America 
from two interrelated sets of tools: a criteria approach and a policy choice framework. 
This chapter summarizes the conclusions reached and raises some final remarks. 
 
7.1  Key parallels and differences between SIFs and CCTs 
The hypothesis stated in chapter 1 attributed the current centrality of CCTs to 
certain design and implementation features that helped overcome previous 
mechanisms, as well as domestic and external factors which shaped policy choices 
towards their creation and replication. To test the first proposition of this hypothesis, 
an assessment of SIFs and CCTs through a criteria framework was carried out. Its 
results were mixed, since both types of intervention simultaneously had a number of 
positive and negative aspects. 
For instance, the political feasibility of SIFs was boosted by the absence of 
immediate losers and the support from a wide pool of stakeholders, but their special 
nature and procedures were a source of bureaucratic jealousy among government 
agencies. As for CCTs, despite being originally created through redistributive 
mechanisms (tax increase or reduction of subsidies), they were in line with the values 
                                                 
33 For instance, Zedillo’s Under-Secretary for Expenditures, Santiago Levy, considered the intellect 
behind Progresa’s conception and design was a former World Bank researcher. 
46 of policy elites and their constituencies, by including the co-responsibility of the poor 
towards their own well-being. 
While SIFs had the advantage of speed, due to their hierarchical position, 
special regulations and abundant resources, they suffered from a lack of coordination 
with sectoral ministries, which compromised the long run sustainability of the projects 
they financed. CCTs, in turn, were better integrated with line ministries. But they 
entailed fairly complex and expensive requirements for their initial set up and as yet 
have not been able to resolve several administrative and operational issues. 
In terms of adequacy as poverty reduction interventions, SIFs have scored 
poorly as safety nets, but they have succeeded in providing economic and social 
infrastructure to poor communities. In the same way, CCTs were not judged effective 
safety nets for emergency situations, neither substitutes for supply-side interventions. 
However, they had the advantage of tackling several problems in a single policy 
response, combining short-run poverty alleviation through income transfers with 
incentives for long-run human capital accumulation. Although there seems to be an 
inevitable trade-off between these two goals, it is perhaps this combination that 
accounts for the true innovation brought forth by CCTs, allowing them to play a 
crucial role in asset-building for the poor and thus effectively contributing to 
structural poverty reduction. 
Targeting in SIFs was much looser than what CCTs intended to achieve. The 
introduction of poverty maps was an important advance of the former, but the type of 
projects financed contributed to excluding women from the jobs created and the 
demand-driven approach adopted did not necessarily benefit the poorest. CCTs 
brought targeting to the household level, trying to reach the poorest families, not only 
the poorest communities. Nevertheless, several flaws were identified in the actual 
targeting methods employed in the cases studied. 
Regarding collateral effects, SIFs have contributed to capacity-building at the 
local level through their demand-driven features and support to decentralization 
processes. CCTs, in turn, while contributing to empowering women and generating 
multiplier effects in local economies, have also entailed significant private and social 
costs at the household and community levels. 
These mixed records should not be all surprising, since there cannot be 
something such as a ‘perfect policy’, with no drawbacks or shortcomings. Still, this 
assessment confirms that CCTs indeed exceed SIFs in some aspects. Other negative 
47 aspects have emerged, but they are in general quite different from the negative 
features of SIFs. 
All in all, CCTs seem to be a logical and complementary follow-up of SIFs. 
While the funds had a crucial role in the provision of social services and infrastructure 
to the poor, they have only addressed supply-side constraints. The presence of a health 
post or a school in a poor community is not automatically translated into greater 
investments in human capital. Demand-side incentives might be necessary for making 
sure that these services and infrastructure effectively reach the poor. And CCTs can 
fill this gap. 
 
7.2  SIFs and CCTs as policy choices 
To test the second part of this paper’s hypothesis, an analysis of the policy 
processes which led to the creation and replication of SIFs and CCTs was carried out, 
focusing on contexts, agenda-setting circumstances and four factors that shape 
decision-making. Two of these factors were primarily domestic (political stability and 
support and bureaucratic implications), one was external (international pressure and 
leverage) and one was both domestic and external (technical advice). 
This analysis allowed for some conclusions, but it was constrained by the lack 
of primary data, as many crucial aspects of decision-making are not registered and can 
only be recovered through interviews with those who took part in or were close 
witnesses of those moments. Also, the analysis was restricted to the circumstances 
surrounding the cases studied. Therefore, some of the conclusions drawn might not be 
generalizable to all SIFs and CCT programs created in Latin America. 
Overall, the environmental context that surrounded the creation of the ESF, 
Progresa and Bolsa Escola was one of economic crisis and adjustment. 
Macroeconomic stabilization was the number one priority of most Latin American 
governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s and Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico 
followed the same pattern. However, at the moment of the creation of these programs, 
perceptions on the acuteness of the crisis might have varied, thus entailing different 
agenda-setting circumstances. In Bolivia, the perceived stakes involved seem to have 
been somewhat higher than in Mexico and much higher than in Brazil. 
Still, in the three cases studied, all the four factors analyzed appear to have 
played an important role, although with some variations in degree. Political stability 
and support ranked high in all the cases, but for different reasons and in different 
48 moments. While in Bolivia the creation of the ESF was regarded as a crucial element 
for the survival of the regime, the CCT programs of Mexico and Brazil had electoral 
considerations behind their coverage expansions. 
Bureaucratic implications seem to have had a higher prominence in the initial 
design of SIFs than CCTs. Issues of institutional capacity in Bolivian line ministries 
led to bypassing them altogether, while Mexico and Brazil integrated their CCT 
programs into existing ministries, as regular government programs. 
Technical advice, both domestic and external, was important in all three 
experiences. The World Bank and the IDB played an important role in this sense, 
especially in the design of the Bolivian ESF and, to a lesser extent, the Mexican 
Progresa. 
These same agencies were the main drive behind the international leverage 
and support which helps explaining the popularity of both SIFs and CCTs across the 
Latin American region. Interestingly, this factor was much more important in the 
creation of the Bolivian ESF than Progresa or Bolsa Escola, which were home-grown 
initiatives. As such, the creation of ESF seems to have followed a more top-down 
approach from the national government’s perspective. However, from the perspective 
of states, local governments or communities, Progresa and Bolsa Escola can be 
equally considered top-down initiatives. 
The spread of both SIFs and CCTs in Latin America is inextricably linked to 
international leverage. As these interventions gain popularity in donor reports and 
international conferences, and as additional funds and technical assistance are made 
available for governments willing to introduce them, strong incentives for their 
replication are created. This illustrates how international organizations are 
increasingly shaping the discourse and practice of social policy around the developing 
world (Deacon et al. 1997), but it does not lead to a clear cut conclusion that 
governments have no choices or room for maneuver in their poverty-reduction 
policies. The home-grown experiences of Progresa and Bolsa Escola show how this 
phenomenon can also work the other way around: they were national ‘inventions’ 
which were ‘bought’ by donors and ‘sold’ as innovative solutions elsewhere. 
 
7.3 Final  remarks 
As much as CCTs might have an important role in structural poverty 
reduction, there are limits to what these interventions can achieve. Although low 
49 levels of human capital are a central reason for the low incomes of the poor in Latin 
America, this is only one part of the story. Complementary macroeconomic policies, 
which take into account the balance between social protection and macroeconomic 
stabilization, are essential for long-term sustainable poverty reduction (Cornia 2002). 
Also crucial are interventions to alter deeply rooted and reproduced inequalities, as 
well as to foster the accumulation of other assets by the poor (Székely 2001). 
In this sense, the increasing prominence of CCTs in the development agenda 
of Latin America should be regarded with caution. They can be a step forward 
conventional safety nets in the direction of ‘enabling springboards’, as devised in a 
recent World Bank strategy for the social sector (World Bank 2001b). They can be 
win-win alternatives for donors and recipients, in the words of Morley and Coady 
(2003), as the year 2015 draws closer and the advances towards the Millennium 
Development Goals remain rather disappointing. But they just cannot do it all. 
Governments have to consider their own country specificities carefully before 
adopting CCTs indiscriminately. If the poor are located in remote areas, with no ac-
cess to social services whatsoever, a SIF-type program or another kind of supply-side 
intervention might be required before any kind of CCT is put in place. If the quality of 
public education is at an unacceptable low level, a CCT program will only have sym-
bolic results, with no real impacts in terms of human capital accumulation. More im-
portantly, if the country’s macroeconomic model is one that perpetuates inequality, 
limits productive investment, restricts employment and generates poverty, CCTs end 
up functioning as a mere relief measure with localized impacts. In the words of 
Székely (2001: p. 11 and p. 27): 
Relying on these programs [CCTs] as the full social strategy of a country is like 
throwing the poor a lifesaver that may keep them temporarily afloat but doing 
nothing about the storm that is drowning them. (...)  
If other elements of the economic environment are not modified, these types of 
government intervention will always be swimming against the tide. 
Unless this is taken into account, CCTs risk remaining only a fashionable set 
of programs with laudable objectives. 
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